In case you're looking for something to send you off to sleep, here's some of my research. When I'm fortunate enough to get a paper accepted, I publish under the name 'J. W. Evershed' to try and reduce the extent to which I benefit from the gender citation gap. If you'd like to know more about any work that's in preparation, please don't hesitate to send me an email!
Publications
1. Evershed, J. W. (2021). Another Way Logic Might Be Normative. Synthese, 199(3), 5861–5881. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03049-z [pdf]
Abstract. Is logic normative for reasoning? In the wake of work by Gilbert Harman and John MacFarlane, this question has been reduced to: are there any adequate bridge principles which link logical facts to normative constraints on reasoning? Hitherto, defenders of the normativity of logic have exclusively focussed on identifying adequate validity bridge principles: principles linking validity facts—facts of the form 'Γ entails φ'—to normative constraints on reasoning. This paper argues for two claims. First, for the time being at least, Harman’s challenge cannot be surmounted by articulating validity bridge principles. Second, Harman’s challenge can be met by articulating invalidity bridge principles: principles linking invalidity facts of the form 'Γ does not entail ψ' to normative constraints on reasoning. In doing so, I provide a novel defence of the normativity of logic.
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2. Evershed, J. W. (2021). Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 121(3), 411–424. DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoab005 [pdf]
Abstract. According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between these two strands of thought? This paper makes two claims. First, logic is doubly normative for reasoning because, in addition to constraining the combinations of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may form them. Second, given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, a wide array of logical pluralisms are inconsistent with the normativity of logic as they entail contradictory claims about how agents ought to reason. Thus, if logic is normative for reasoning, these pluralisms are untenable.
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Works in Progress
1. Super Fanaticism.
Abstract. According to fanatics, no matter how good a guaranteed payoff is, it is worse than almost certainly getting nothing and a tiny probability of getting some much better payoff. Most find this claim to be, at the very least, highly counterintuitive. But rejecting fanaticism is easier said than done because it is entailed by other highly plausible principles, leaving us with a paradox. This paper aims to deepen the fanatical paradox. According to super fanatics, no matter how good a guaranteed payoff is, it is worse than almost certainly getting a very bad payoff and a tiny probability of getting some much better payoff. I demonstrate that super fanaticism is entailed by principles no less plausible than those used in the original paradox, before drawing out super fanaticism’s implications for interpersonal cases, longtermism, and the fanaticism debate more broadly. super_fanaticism.pdf
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2. Two Generations of Arguments for the Beneficiary Pays Principle.
Abstract. Every day, millions across the globe are victims of injustices perpetrated by others. Who is responsible for remedying them? According to the beneficiary pays principle, the beneficiaries of an injustice can acquire remedial duties towards its victims even though they are not responsible for the injustice and benefit from it involuntarily. This paper lays down three constraints that any justification of the beneficiary pays principle must satisfy, and argues existing justifications of the beneficiaries pays principle fall foul of these constraints.
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3. How to Abduct a Logical Nihilist.
Abstract. How many correct logics are there? Contrary to logical monists and pluralists, logical nihilists answer that there are none. According to the species of nihilism developed by Gillian Russell, this is because there are no laws of logic: there are counterexamples even to basic putative laws like conjunction introduction and identity. The objective of this paper is to defend the existence of logical laws against Russellian nihilism. I show how to defuse Russell’s counterexamples and that, once defused, law-loving logicians can give a novel kind of abductive argument for the existence of basic logical laws.
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4. Supervenience to the Rescue! Saving the Connexion Between Desert and Responsibility.
Abstract. Central to our notion of desert is a tight connexion between what we deserve and what we are responsible for. Seemingly, what we deserve depends exclusively upon things we are responsible for. For instance, a student might deserve a good grade because they worked hard, but not because their parents are wealthy. Call this the 'dependence thesis'. Despite its pedigree, the dependence thesis has been subjected to a barrage of objections and has subsequently gone out of vogue. This paper aims to show that those sympathetic to the dependence thesis need not despair: there is a reading of the dependence thesis which avoids these objections. The trick is to get clear on what we mean by 'deserves' and to articulate the dependence relation in terms of supervenience. I conclude with some remarks on how this version of the dependence thesis leaves room for desert to be extended to those who are not responsible for any of their actions, such as the severely mentally disabled and non-human animals.
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5. Desert and Replaceability.
Abstract. This paper explores how consequentialists who affirm the moral importance of desert can respond to replaceability arguments.
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MPhil Thesis
Here is my MPhil thesis—written under my original name, 'James Skinner'. Warning: 'How to Kill 999 Flowers' is a powerful sedative and is only to be read as a last resort in cases of severe insomnia.
Abstract. How many correct logics are there? For much of logic’s history it was widely assumed that there was exactly one correct logic, a position known as logical monism. However, the monist’s hegemony has recently become increasingly precarious as she has simultaneously come under attack from two sides. On one side she faces logical pluralists who contend that there is more than one correct logic, and on the other she faces logical nihilists who contend that there are no correct logics. This thesis aims to defend monism against the twin threats of pluralism and nihilism.
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